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ABSTRACT
This paper presents the results of a survey carried out in 2017.
The research was focused on the behaviour of Polish local and
regional formal institutions (L.G.U.s) in support of the develop-
ment of local and regional entrepreneurship. The main aim was
to determine which institutions are crucial for the support of the
development of entrepreneurship, but, more importantly, to find
why some L.G.U.s obeyed the rules of the entrepreneurship game
even if the state monitoring and enforcement mechanisms were
lacking. Statistical tools of correlation analysis and factor analysis
were used in the research. The factor analysis added empirical
evidence on the discussion on how L.G.U.s may affect develop-
ment of entrepreneurship. Based on the statistically processed
data obtained from research, the authors came to the conclusion
that geographic location, political power, level of unemployment,
size of the territory or level of debt had no impact on the behav-
iour of L.G.U.s in their support of the development of entrepre-
neurship. What mattered for the support of entrepreneurship by
L.G.U.s was the model of management, type of L.G.U., and the
number of enterprises within the territory governed by L.G.U.s.
Moreover, only provinces fully succeeded in supporting the devel-
opment of entrepreneurship, while rural municipalities failed.
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1. Introduction
Entrepreneurship plays a significant role in the process of the socio-economic develop-
ment of economies (Williams, Vorley, & Williams, 2017), especially in countries at the
intermediate stage of development (such as Central and East European countries, here-
inafter C.E.E.C.s) that want to narrow the distance that separates them from world
leaders. Moreover, entrepreneurship has been a key force of economic growth at
national level (Acs, Desai, & Hessels, 2008; Audretsch & Thurik, 2001; Baumol, 1990)
and at the regional level (Huggins & Thompson, 2016). However, not all entrepreneur-
ship leads to growth. Entrepreneurship may be productive, unproductive and destruc-
tive (Baumol, 1990; Sautet, 2013), mostly because of market failures (Akerlof & Shiller,
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2015). To overcome these market failures the concept of ‘institutions’ may be used to
understand better the nature of the entrepreneurship context (Williams & Vorley,
2015). Institutions matter for the development of entrepreneurship because they reduce
uncertainty, information and transaction costs (Arrow, 1969; North, 1990; Williamson,
1979), or provide conditions for the development of economic activity and the stimula-
tion of entrepreneurship (Baumol, Litan, & Schramm, 2009; North, 1990). Institutions
also matter for regional and local development (Rodrıguez-Pose, 2013), as well as for
the development of regional and local entrepreneurship (Wołowiec & Skica, 2013).
Furthermore, local government units (hereinafter L.G.U.s, understood as local and
regional formal institutions) became responsible for the dynamic growth of local and
regional entrepreneurial activity following the process of decentralisation that occurred
in European countries (Skica, Bem, & Daszynska- _Zygadło, 2013).
The number of studies on the relation between institutions and entrepreneurship
is growing rapidly, but scholars focus mainly on: (i) the impact of institutions on the
entrepreneurship rate or type; (ii) institutional barriers; (iii) impact of entrepreneur-
ship on institutional change; (iv) institutional asymmetry; or (v) the impact of the
institutional environment on productive, unproductive or destructive entrepreneur-
ship (see, for example, Audretsch, Keilbach, & Lehmann, 2006; Estrin & Mickiewicz,
2010; Levie, Autio, Acs, & Hart, 2014; Williams & Vorley, 2015; Williams et al.,
2017). Moreover, scholars have proved that institutional support has a crucial influ-
ence on entrepreneurship activity (Baumol, 1990; Minniti & Levesque, 2008; Shane,
2009; Williams & Shahid, 2016; Williams et al., 2017). Formal institutions within a
country or a region define the entrepreneurial capacity of nations (North, 1990).
However, scholars have also highlighted that not only formal institutions such as the
legal environment or L.G.U., but also informal institutions such as culture, tradition
and history play a vital role for entrepreneurial success (Baumol et al., 2009; Huggins
& Thompson, 2016). Williams et al. (2017) argue that the most important factor for
the development of entrepreneurship is the interplay between formal and informal
institutions within a country or a region. Moreover, entrepreneurial activity will be
fostered when formal and informal institutions complement each other and entrepre-
neurial activity is stymied where there is asymmetry between formal and informal
institutions (Williams & Vorley, 2015). But is it possible that some formal institutions
are able to use the mechanism of self-enforcement in order to foster ‘productive’
entrepreneurial activity, even in the asymmetrical situation between formal and infor-
mal institutions as exists in C.E.E.C.s? According to the authors’ best knowledge,
there is no similar research which examines the exogenous and endogenous factors
that play a crucial role in the self-enforcement mechanism of L.G.U.s that facilitate
change of their behaviour towards entrepreneurship support. For policy-makers, espe-
cially from transition economies such as C.E.E.C.s, the actual challenge is to create a
favourable institutional environment in which a self-enforcement mechanism is used
by institutions in order to change, modify or strengthen their behaviour towards
‘productive’ entrepreneurship support.
This article advances institutional research through the development of a better
understanding of institutional behaviour at local and regional levels by focusing on
the endogenous and exogenous factors that matter for the self-enforcement
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mechanism of L.G.U.s which were externalised by support of local and regional entre-
preneurship. This article, therefore, aims not only at determining which institutions
are crucial for the support of the development of entrepreneurship, but, more import-
antly, at finding why some L.G.U.s obeyed the rules of the entrepreneurship game
(regulations and government guidelines for the development of entrepreneurial activ-
ities) even if the state monitoring and enforcement mechanisms were lacking. We
deliberately chose Poland as an example of a C.E.E.C. We believe that the particular
pattern of the self-enforcement mechanism of institutional behaviour identified in
Poland is relevant not only for C.E.E.C.s, but also for other countries at the inter-
mediate development stage in Africa, Asia and Latin America. We look at entrepre-
neurship from the region-wide perspective, which allows us to focus on a range of
regulations, L.G.U.s, as well as socio-economic variables.
2. Research of institutions’ behaviour in their support of local and
regional entrepreneurship
Institutional theory may be an insight into understanding the influence of institu-
tions’ behaviour on entrepreneurship. Moreover, according to theories of entrepre-
neurship, institutions influence: (i) the quality of entrepreneurship activities by
directing them to productive, unproductive or destructive initiatives (Baumol, 1990);
(ii) entrepreneurial attitudes to set up a new business and to become an entrepreneur
(Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2010; North, 1994) driven by opportunity or necessity
(Fuentelsaz, Gonzalez, Maıcas, & Montero, 2015); (iii) the type of new ventures
(Minniti & Levesque, 2008); (iv) the level of entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2008); as
well as (v) economic prosperity by facilitating entrepreneurship, or economic stagna-
tion by hindering entrepreneurship (Holcombe, 2015). Furthermore, institutions
should eliminate market failures and create a supportive context for the development
of entrepreneurship (Fuentelsaz et al., 2015).
Although entrepreneurship activity has often been the subject of research, until
now not one definition of entrepreneurship has commonly been accepted by scholars.
In the literature, entrepreneurship is defined as: (i) activity based on taking advantage
of opportunities and risks (Cantillon, 1755); (ii) moving resources from a lower cap-
acity area to a higher capacity area by entrepreneurs (Say, 1800); (iii) profits in
exchange for uncertainty and risk (Knight, 1921); and (iv) introduction of new prod-
ucts, services, materials, production methods, markets or form of organisation
(Schumpeter, 1934). In our research we understand entrepreneurship to be a process
of using opportunities (created by institutions) to introduce new products, services or
markets (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000, p. 219).
The importance of institutions for entrepreneurship development at national as
well as regional and local levels has been widely discussed in the literature in recent
years, from the theoretical (see, for example, Baumol, 1990; North, 1990; Rodrıguez-
Pose, 2013; Williamson, 2000) and empirical perspectives (see, for example,
Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013). Not only institutions
but also institutional context matter for the development of entrepreneurship (Acs
et al., 2008; Boettke & Coyne, 2007; Williams & Shahid, 2016). Scholars have
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highlighted that entrepreneurship is a leading force of economic development
through employment, innovation, or spillover of knowledge (Baumol, 2002;
Schumpeter, 1934; Wennekers & Thurik, 1999). The European Commission (E.C.) as
well as the European Parliament also noticed the relationship between institutional
support of entrepreneurship development and economic growth (see, for example, the
Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan). The support of entrepreneurship, the harmoni-
ous development of all European Union (E.U.) member states, as well as reducing
disparities between the regional level of development became a priority for the E.C.
(Treaty on the functioning of the European Union).
Institutions matter (Arrow, 1969; Coase, 1937, 1960; North, 1990, 1994; Rodrıguez-
Pose, 2013; Williamson, 1979). North (1990) divided institutions as: formal institu-
tions (formal rules, law and constitutions) and informal institutions (constraints, cus-
toms, norms). Later on North (1994) as well as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2005, pp. 386–387) make a further distinction between economic institutions
(‘determine the incentives of and the constraints on economic actors, and shape eco-
nomic outcomes’) and political institutions (‘allocate de jure political power’). On the
other hand, Hodgson (2006, p. 13) added social institutions (‘social rule-system’).
Meanwhile, in the literature there is a debate on which institutions (political, eco-
nomic, legal, social) matter for economic development at the national level
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; Williamson, 2009). However, until now, according
to the authors’ best knowledge, nobody has examined which institutions matter at
local and regional levels. The enforcement mechanisms of L.G.U.s also matter,
because when weak they may strengthen ‘the grey economy’ or lead to unproductive
entrepreneurship (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009). However, there is a lack
of knowledge concerning the exogenous and endogenous factors which have an influ-
ence on the self-enforcement mechanisms of institutions’ behaviour in order to sup-
port the development of entrepreneurship. We consider this paper a contribution to
filling these gaps.
2.1. Model of management
The research conducted by Voigt (2013) emphasises that scholars are able to observe
only the behaviour of the institutions instead of their preferences. The institutions’
behaviour may depend on the adopted model of public administration. The trad-
itional model of public administration is based on the Weberian model of bureau-
cracy: rule-of-law-oriented, meritocratic, unpolitical, impersonal, centralised,
hierarchical, and professionalised with technical rationalisation (Sager & Rosser,
2009). Moreover, some scholars highlight the importance of the Weberian model of
bureaucracy, especially for developing economies, in order to spur a country’s or a
region’s development (Evans & Rauch, 2000). On the other hand, the Public Choice
research of bureaucracy stresses that boreoarctic structures lead to inefficient use of
resources, unnecessary expenditure, or permanent overproduction of public services
(Tullock, 1965). Other scholars argue that the traditional Weberian model of bureau-
cracy is inefficient and should be replaced by the New Public Management (N.P.M.)
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model. The N.P.M. model improves the efficiency and quality of public services by
including more participation of citizens as well as entrepreneurs in the management
process, flexibility, internal deregulation, and the use of the market mechanism exter-
nally (Peters, 2001). Nowadays, L.G.U.s may choose between different models of
management, such as: (i) model of public administration; (ii) model of N.P.M.; (iii)
model of public co-management; (iv) model of new public services; (v) model of
innovative management; (vi) model of relationships management; (vii) model of man-
agement by aims; or (viii) model of management by quality. In order to examine the
impact of the model of management on institutions’ behaviour towards the support
of entrepreneurship the following hypothesis was introduced:
H1: The behaviour of L.G.U.s towards the support of the development of local and
regional entrepreneurship depended on the model of management of L.G.U.s.
2.2. Location and level of debt
It is generally acknowledged that institutions at the national level provide the founda-
tion for regional and local entrepreneurship. The region is the most important con-
text for entrepreneurship (Karlsson & Dalherg, 2003), but also for institutions
(Rodrıguez-Pose, 2013). Location matters for entrepreneurship (see, for example,
Krugman, 1991) and should also matter for the behaviour of L.G.U.s. Over recent
years many scientific papers have examined the impact of institutions on regional or
place-based development (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodrıguez-Pose, 2013). However,
the opposite situation is also very important. Scholars have proved the impact of
informal institutions such as place-based culture, customs or traditions on formal
institutions’ behaviour (Holmes et al., 2013; Huggins & Thompson, 2016). Moreover,
differences of location such as geography, climate or size of the territory also have an
impact on institutions’ behaviour (Acemoglu et al., 2005).
Institutions’ behaviour towards support of entrepreneurship may also depend on
the level of funding. Previous research on L.G.U. debts in transition economies has
shown that debt has a positive impact on ‘the modernisation of the local economies
and job creations’ (Dafflon & Beer-Toth, 2009, p. 305). So formal institutions with
debts should be much more eager to support the development of entrepreneurship.
In order to examine the impact of location and level of debt on institutions’ behav-
iour towards the support of entrepreneurship the following hypothesis
was introduced:
H2: The behaviour of L.G.U.s in the support of the development of local and regional
entrepreneurship depended on the location and level of debt of L.G.U.s.
2.3. Type of institution and the number of enterprises
Institutions’ behaviour towards the support of entrepreneurship may also depend on
the type of institution. In 1985 the member states of the Council of Europe (C.o.E.)
introduced the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The C.o.E. was con-
vinced that the existence of local institutions with responsibilities, resources and with
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a close relationship with citizens would provide more effective administration, and as
a consequence accelerate the development of local and regional economies. After
transformation C.E.E.C.s also decided to decentralise power and reinforce local self-
government units. Unfortunately, C.E.E.C.s did not introduce an effective enforce-
ment mechanism with sanctions to guarantee that L.G.U.s would support the devel-
opment of entrepreneurship in order to reduce inequalities and accelerate regional
development. In the E.U., L.G.U.s include: municipalities, districts and provinces.
Municipalities in the E.U. outnumber other regional institutions. We may have rural
municipalities (the most numerous), urban municipalities and urban–rural municipal-
ities, as well as cities with district rights. L.G.U.s differ between each other due to
tradition, customs, history, the size of the territory, level of economic development,
resources or responsibilities (Koellinger & Thurik, 2012). However, a certain pattern
of institutional behaviour identified in Poland should be relevant for all of the
C.E.E.C.s, as well as for other countries at the intermediate development stage in
Africa, Asia and Latin America.
It is acknowledged that institutions influence regional variation in firm birth rates.
The research conducted by Fritsch and Storey (2014) on regional new business for-
mation stressed the role of both formal institutions and informal institutions such as
social capital and a culture of entrepreneurship. However, the opposite situation is
also important. The number of enterprises in a territory of local government units
may also stimulate institutions’ behaviour towards the support or non-support of the
development of entrepreneurship. In order to examine the impact of the type of insti-
tution and the number of enterprises on institutions’ behaviour towards the support
of entrepreneurship the following hypothesis was introduced:
H3: The behaviour of L.G.U.s in the support of the development of local and regional
entrepreneurship depended on the type of local formal institution and the number of
enterprises in the territory governed by L.G.U.s.
3. Research and methods
To achieve the objective of the paper empirical research on a representative sample of
L.G.U.s was conducted, and data were statistically processed and interpreted. The
research was carried out in summer and autumn 2017. Data were acquired using a
survey with quantitative and qualitative research questions in the questionnaire,
which was sent to n¼ 3388 formal institutions in Poland. Unfortunately, the response
rate from formal institutions was only 19.24% (n¼ 652). Moreover, due to the very
low level of response (5%) from formal institutions of central government the repre-
sentative fraction could only be drawn from the L.G.U.s. The collected data covered
the characteristics of L.G.U.s, such as: the number of actions that support entrepre-
neurial development, cooperation with informal institutions, number of actions
undertaken to support fair competition, model of management, administration level,
type of local government unit, region, unemployment rate, number of enterprises by
10,000 citizens, size of territory, income and expenses per capita, level of debt, and
recent change in the position of the mayor, president or district governor.
Furthermore, due to the problems with missing data, instead of the imputation
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procedure the size of the sample was reduced to n¼ 211 for L.G.U.s with a 5%
materiality level and 6.5% maximum error (2SE). After reduction the sample was ran-
domly distributed because 82.99% of the sample comprised municipalities (in popula-
tion 85.99%), 17% of the sample were districts and cities with district rights (in
population 14%), and 0.01% of the sample were provinces (in population 0.01%). The
sample was considered representative for all L.G.U.s in Poland.
Second, hereafter the authors define the local and regional formal institutions as
local and regional regulations which established the rules of the ‘local and regional
economic activity game’ in Poland, as well as L.G.U.s who were responsible for ‘the
play of local and regional economic activity game in Poland’.
Third, the behaviour of L.G.U.s was considered the dependent variable in the
model (BFLI), and may have been observed by the number of actions undertaken
yearly by these institutions in the support of the above-mentioned development.
The independent variables were the following: (i) model of management of L.G.U.s
(MMFI); (ii) change of political power in position of mayor, president, district gov-
ernor or province marshal (CPP); (iii) size of the territory (ST); (iv) type of L.G.U.
(TLGU); (v) macro-regions (REG); (vi) provinces (REG II); (vii) unemployment rate
(UR); (viii) number of enterprises (NE); and (ix) debt of L.G.U. per capita (LGUD)
(see the Appendix).
The acquired data were statistically evaluated. Dependences among the selected data
were analysed using internal and cross-correlation. Following the correlation check
between dependent and independent variables, it was found that there was no correl-
ation between institutions’ behaviour towards the support of the development of entre-
preneurship and the change of political power in either position (CPP), no correlation
with location (province, REG II), and no correlation with the unemployment rate in
the governed territory (UR), as well as with size of the territory (ST) (see Table 1).
Significant statistical correlations were, however, found between institutions’ behaviour
towards the support of the development of entrepreneurship and: the type of L.G.U.
(TLGU), the number of enterprises in the territory of L.G.U. (NE), the model of man-
agement (all at the 0.01 level), macro-region (REG), and the level of debt (at the level
of 0.05). The strength of the correlation were very weak for independent variables as
REG, LGUD or MMFI (bellow 0.2) and weak for NE or TLGU (from 0.27 to 0.35).
Furthermore, according to 84.4% of L.G.U.s, no informal institutions functioned in
their environment. Moreover, all L.G.U.s that recognised and cooperated with infor-
mal institutions (11.8% of respondents) understood informal institutions as local
action groups that supported the development of local and regional entrepreneurship,
rather than a custom, a value, or a norm. The interplay between formal and informal
institutions depends on the institutional framework (De Soto, 2000). Because of the
Table 1. Correlation.
TLGU REG BFLI NE LGUD MMFI REG II CPP UR ST
BFLI Correlation .349 2.130 1 .274 .143 .185 .050 .009 .085 .052
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .030 .000 .019 .003 .466 .446 .110 .277
N 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211
Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).Correlation was significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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weak institutional framework in Poland, according to most cited institutional indices,
such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators 2017 of the World Bank Group or the
Global Competitiveness Index 2017–2018 of the World Economic Forum, and the
very low level of trust according to the European Social Survey 2014, informal institu-
tions did not complement or substitute the weak Polish formal institutions.
Fourth, due to the correlation among independent variables, the relationship
between the dependent variable with each of the independent variables was tested
separately. The empirical model was synthesised in the following equation:
BFLIi ¼ an þ bnQni þ eni
where:
 BFLIi – behaviour of L.G.U.s for supporting the development of local and regional
entrepreneurship in Poland;
 i ¼ L.G.U.;
 Qn ¼ TLGU (Q1), REG (Q2), NE (Q3), LGUD (Q4), MMFI (Q5);
 a1; a2; a3; a4; a5 designate the factors that affect the behaviour of L.G.U.s for sup-
porting the development of local and regional entrepreneurship other than Q1, Q2,
Q3, Q4, Q5;
 b1; b2; b3; b4; b5 measure the change in the behaviour of L.G.U.s for supporting
the development of local and regional entrepreneurship due to changes in Q1, Q2,
Q3, Q4, Q5;
 Ɛni designate the error terms or the gap between the behaviour of L.G.U.s for sup-
porting the development of local and regional entrepreneurship observed, and
those estimated for a given values of Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5.
Statistical results (see Table 2) showed that actions undertaken by L.G.U.s in the sup-
port of the development of entrepreneurship varied between no support and three to
six actions, with a concentration around the median of one to two actions. These
characteristics indicated that the distribution of the number of actions undertaken by
L.G.U.s in the support of the development of entrepreneurship was not symmetrical.
Because the assumption of normal distribution has not been proven by
Kolmogrov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk tests, in order to analyse the data non-para-
metric tests were employed. Statistical analyses were conducted using the IBM SPSS
Statistic Program Version 24. Both Mann–Whitney U and Wilcoxon W tests were





Std error Statistic Std error Statistic Std error
TLGU 211 1 6 2.18 .088 1.283 1.647 .823 .167 .372 .333
REG 211 1 7 3.86 .139 2.019 4.075 .028 .167 1.311 .333
BFLI 211 1 5 2.33 .092 1.332 1.774 .847 .167 .325 .333
NE 211 1 6 3.16 .071 1.029 1.060 .359 .167 .230 .333
LGUD 211 1 6 1.63 .077 1.124 1.264 2.017 .167 3.841 .333
MMFI 211 1 8 1.47 .072 1.048 1.098 3.115 .167 12.003 .333
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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used. The selected test of significance of differences allowed us to verify the null
hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis:
H0 : BFLIA ¼ BFLIB there were no differences in the behaviour of L:G:U:sð Þ
and against the alternative hypothesis:
H1 : BFLIA 6¼ BFLIB there were differences in the behaviour of L:G:U:sð Þ
where:
BFLIA – dependent variable determined by a given factor in a group supporting the
development of local and regional entrepreneurship;
BFLIB – dependent variable determined by a given factor in a group not supporting
the development of local and regional entrepreneurship.
If the significance level was greater than or equal to a¼ 0.05, there was no reason
to reject H0. However, when the a value was less than 0.05 the null hypothesis
was rejected.
Finally, we focused only on the local and regional levels of a single country, which
was Poland. Our results may not be representative for regions of ‘Western’ member
states of the E.U. (i.e., Germany, Sweden, Denmark, France, Spain or the United
Kingdom) which, according to the European Quality of Government Index 2017, had
much stronger regional institutions than those from C.E.E.C., just after the transition
period and decentralisation process. For example, regions from, France (from 0.3 to
1.1), Germany (from 0.3 to more than 1.1), Sweden and Denmark (more than 1.1),
and the United Kingdom (from 0.7 to more than 1.1) were all above the E.U. average.
By comparison, regions from C.E.E.C.s (except Estonia and one region in the Czech
Republic), as well as Greece, Cyprus and Italy were all below the E.U. average.
Regions in countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary were below the E.U.
average, from –0.5 to more then –1.2, and Poland, from –0.3 to –0.7. As a result,
Table 3. Mann–Whitney test.
Hypothesis
Behaviour of L.G.U.s for supporting the development
of local and regional entrepreneurship in Poland N Mean rank Sum of ranks
Model of management Unsupportive 72 94.80 6825.50
Supportive 139 111.80 15,540.50
Total 211
Type of L.G.U. Unsupportive 72 86.38 6219.50
Supportive 139 116.16 16,146.50
Total 211
Macro-region Unsupportive 72 114.63 8253.50
Supportive 139 101.53 14,112.50
Total 211
Level of debts per 1
citizen in Polish New
Zloty (PLN)
Unsupportive 72 101.47 7305.50
Supportive 139 108.35 15,060.50
Total 211
Number of enterprises Unsupportive 72 90.83 6540.00
Supportive 139 113.86 15,826.00
Total 211
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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future research will be required to ensure the wider international applicability of
the research.
4. Evaluation of acquired data and discussion
The results are summarised in Table 3 and Table 4. Generally, the hypotheses on the
relationship between the institutions’ behaviour towards the support of the develop-
ment of entrepreneurship and the model of management, the type of L.G.U., and the
number of enterprises were validated (a < 0.05). However, the hypothesis on the
relationship between the institutions’ behaviour towards the support of the develop-
ment of entrepreneurship and the location (macro-region) as well as the level of debt
was not validated (a > 0.05).
Entrepreneurship is generally acknowledged to be a key force of economic growth,
and that is why formal institutions undertake action to support the development of
entrepreneurship in order to stimulate growth (see, for example, Acemoglu et al.
2005). On the national level formal institutions may introduce different programmes
and policies to stimulate entrepreneurial activities (Cumming et al., 2014). On the
other hand, more attention, according to Wennekers and Thurik (1999), should be
devoted to the local and regional level. Moreover, L.G.U.s which are closest to the
entrepreneur should know best which actions/instruments will be most efficient in
stimulating entrepreneurship in their environment (Wołowiec & Skica, 2013).
Furthermore, opportunities created by formal institutions allow entrepreneurs to use
the potential of the local institutional regime (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003).
Surprisingly, as much as 34.12% of L.G.U.s in Poland did not support the develop-
ment of entrepreneurship (see Figure 1). The main reason why L.G.U.s did not sup-
port the development of entrepreneurship was, in their opinion, lack of funding (see
Figure 2). However, we proved that lack of funding has no influence on a supportive/
unsupportive attitude towards the development of entrepreneurship. Previous
research on L.G.U. debts in transition economies have shown that debt has a positive
impact on ‘the modernisation of the local economies and job creations’ (Dafflon &
Beer-Toth, 2009, p. 305). Moreover, L.G.U.s with debts should be much more eager
to support the development of entrepreneurship in order to improve their financial
situation, for example by collecting taxes from new businesses. The opinion of
L.G.U.s on lack of funding was simply an excuse due to the lack of a self-enforcement
mechanism. Another reason why L.G.U.s did not support the development of entre-
preneurship was the opinion about a lack of need on the entrepreneurs’ side. Some
Table 4. Test statistics.
Model
of management Type of L.G.U. Macro-region
Level of debts per
1 citizen in PLN
Number of
enterprises
Mann–Whitney U 4197.500 3591.500 4382.500 4677.500 3912.000
Wilcoxon W 6825.500 6219.500 14,112.500 7305.500 6540.000
Z 2.524 3.525 1.495 .947 2.714
Asymp. sig.
(2-tailed)
.012 .000 .135 .344 .007
Grouping variable: Behaviour of the L.G.U. for support of the development of local and regional entrepreneurship
in Poland.
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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L.G.U.s were convinced that the less interference in the local economy there was, the
better it would be for entrepreneurs (see Bjørnskov & Foss, 2013), and that it would
be enough if they established a stable institutional environment. The third reason
why L.G.U.s did not support the development of entrepreneurship was, in their opin-
ion, the low number of enterprises in their territory. However, we proved that when
the number of enterprises was ‘the smallest’, meaning fewer than 600 enterprises (reg-
istered in the Polish National Business Registry per 10,000 inhabitants of working
age), L.G.U.s were very active in supporting the development of entrepreneurship
when compared with L.G.U.s with a higher number of enterprises, between 600 and
2000 (see Figure 3). On the other hand, when the number of enterprises exceeded
3000, then the support of L.G.U.s ceased. The general regularity was that the higher
the number of enterprises within a governed territory of L.G.U., the higher the
Figure 1. Behaviour of L.G.U.s in the support of the development of entrepreneurship in Poland,
yearly by number of undertaken actions.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on survey with L.G.U. n¼ 211.
Figure 2. Support of the development of entrepreneurship by L.G.U.s depending on the level
of debts.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on survey with L.G.U. n¼ 211.
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support for the development of entrepreneurship (with the exception of the number
of enterprises fewer than 600 and more than 3000). It is important to highlight the
research results of Bjørnskov and Foss (2013), who proved that the more support for
the development of entrepreneurship by formal institutions there was, the larger the
positive effect on entrepreneurship. L.G.U.s in emerging economies, in order to be
able to ‘catch up with’ regions of developed economies and compensate for inequal-
ities, need to establish stable and efficient structures which will support business
interactions. Only L.G.U.s with self-enforcement mechanisms succeed and support
the development of local and regional entrepreneurship.
The institutions’ behaviour towards the support of the development of local and
regional entrepreneurship depends on the model of management. It may seem obvi-
ous that the models of management which were concentrated on citizens and entre-
preneurs were more effective in the support of the development of entrepreneurship
than the management model of public administration based on the Max Weber bur-
eaucratic model of public administration. However, in Poland still as much as 74.88%
of L.G.U.s have the traditional Weberian model of public administration (with obliga-
tory changes required by Public Finance Law). Furthermore, L.G.U.s that adopted a
model of N.P.M. were much more eager to support the development of entrepreneur-
ship than L.G.U.s with a traditional management model of public administration (see
Figure 4). Despite the fact that the model of N.P.M. has been criticised by many
scholars, it was speculated that this model facilitated the assurance of formal institu-
tions’ elasticity, and delivered higher regulation quality or better public services that
met the requirements of citizens and entrepreneurs (Kickert, 1997). Moreover, the
model of N.P.M. supports formal institutions’ self-enforcement mechanism towards
the support of the development of entrepreneurship.
Unexpectedly, the results of this work indicated the change of institutions’ behav-
iour towards the support of the development of local and regional entrepreneurship
compared with the research done in 1995–1997 by Gorzelak et al. (1999). Recently,
the institutions’ behaviour towards the support of entrepreneurship has not depended
on the geographic location (understood as one of seven macro-regions or as one of
16 provinces) (see Figure 5). Gorzelak et al. (1999) highlighted that the behaviour of
Figure 3. Support of the development of entrepreneurship by L.G.U.s depending on the number
of enterprises.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on survey with L.G.U. n¼ 211.
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L.G.U.s is based on location in one of the four historical regions (Congress Kingdom
of Poland, Galicja, Wielkopolska, West and North Lands), which after 20 years of
transformation was not proven by the current study. Discrepancies may indicate the
overall change in: (i) the institutions’ behaviour; (ii) the institutional environment for
entrepreneurship; (iii) population drift, resulting in the more equal spread of the
‘entrepreneurship mindset’ throughout the Polish territory; or (iv) the change of
informal institutions, such as the attitude of individuals towards risk, cooperation or
trust that have an impact on more opportunity than necessity-driven entrepreneur-
ship. However, even if there is no statistical correlation between location (REG II)
and the L.G.U. supportive or unsupportive attitude, in 3 out of 16 provinces only
50% or even less of L.G.U.s have a supportive attitude towards the development of
entrepreneurship (see Figure 6).
Figure 5. Support of the development of entrepreneurship by L.G.U.s from different macro-regions.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on survey with L.G.U. n¼ 211.
Figure 4. Support of the development of entrepreneurship by L.G.U.s with different models
of management.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on survey with L.G.U. n¼ 211.
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The institutions’ behaviour towards the support of the development of local and
regional entrepreneurship depends on the type of L.G.U. However, 50% of the rural
municipalities did not support the development of entrepreneurship. The most active
and successful in the support of the development of entrepreneurship were provinces
and cities with district rights (see Figure 7). Moreover, in rural municipalities unsup-
ported entrepreneurship is driven by necessity (Low, Henderson, & Weiler, 2005).
Furthermore, according to scholars, necessity entrepreneurship may be more likely to
fail than opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, especially when supported by L.G.U.s
Figure 6. Supportive behaviour of L.G.U.s towards the development of entrepreneurship in Poland,
classified and presented at provinces level.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on survey with local formal institutions n¼ 211.
Figure 7. Support of the development of entrepreneurship by different type of L.G.U.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on survey with L.G.U. n¼ 211.
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(Acs, 2006; Shane, 2009). Surprisingly, 38% of the districts did not support the devel-
opment of entrepreneurship. The main reason was the belief that it was not a dis-
trict’s but a municipality’s task to support the development of entrepreneurship.
Finally, only provinces fully succeeded in their support of the development of
regional entrepreneurship. By contrast, rural municipalities failed miserably. These
results partly confirmed the conclusions of the research done by Gorzelak et al.
(1999). These authors concluded, based just on a survey results (without measuring
statistical significance), that urban municipalities were much more active in the area
of the support of entrepreneurs than rural ones.
5. Conclusion
Support of L.G.U.s is very important, because it may lead to productive entrepreneur-
ship and regional economic growth. This study has examined endogenous (such as
political competition, model of management or type of L.G.U.) and exogenous (such
as location, size of the territory, number of enterprises or level of unemployment) fac-
tors which have influence on supportive or unsupportive institutions’ behaviour.
Our results suggest that the institutions’ behaviour strongly depends on the model
of management, type of L.G.U., and the number of enterprises in the territory gov-
erned by the L.G.U. Our contribution to filling the gap of knowledge in institutional
research is proving that the self-enforcement mechanism of L.G.U.s matters for sup-
port of entrepreneurship. Because the self-enforcement mechanism of L.G.U.s seems
to be crucial for the development of entrepreneurship, we also examine what explains
the use of this mechanism by considering the interplay with informal institutions. We
found that a greater than expected number of L.G.U.s have no knowledge about the
presence of informal institutions in their surroundings. One possible implication is
Figure 8. L.G.U. behaviour towards entrepreneurship.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Acemoglu et al. (2005), Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2007), Baumol
(1990), De Soto (1989), Fuentelsaz et al. (2015), and North (1990,1994).
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that the weak informal institutions do not lead to the complementing or substituting
of formal institutions, but may actually be evidence of asymmetry between formal
and informal institutions.
Moreover, our research has identified which institutions matter for the develop-
ment of local and regional entrepreneurship by highlighting that provinces and cities
with district rights were the most successful and active in the support of entrepre-
neurship. The agglomeration theory may also explain the success of cities with district
rights. However, rural municipalities and districts failed, and this may be seen as an
institutional failure which should be corrected by reinforcing the enforcement mecha-
nisms with sanctions. Even so, we caution that central government formal institutions
need to consider the costs of reinforcing the enforcement mechanism with sanctions
but that supporting development of entrepreneurship appears to be promising.
One interesting result is that – despite all of the attention that academics, policy-
makers, and economic development professionals have given to location, political
competition or size of the territory in general – there is no evidence that these factors
tend to play any role in the development of local and regional entrepreneurship. In
other words, a higher number of actions undertaken by L.G.U.s to support develop-
ment of entrepreneurship is possible even in municipalities with peripheral location,
small territory and a lack of political competition.
Finally, this article advances institutional research through the development of a
better understanding of institutional behaviour at local and regional levels by finding
why some formal institutions obey the rules of the entrepreneurship game even if the
state monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are lacking, and others do not (see
Figure 8).
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